Yesterday, while we were discussing skepticism, a student (whose name I don't know) was posing the question to the class of if a fish bites a lure, would that be seen as a mistake? The consensus that the class seemed to come to was that it would not be viewed by the fish as a mistake, but to a human being it would be. Professor Johnson asked about the Siberian tiger mauling a human in the zoo: is that viewed as a mistake, or was the tiger following its instincts? I think however that a valid point was lost in class, so here's a brief thought that I jotted down amidst my notes:
a tiger mauling a human -- is that "bad"? We should not try to apply our morals or our logic to species that we cannot understand. If a human being mauled another human being, we would rightly hold that human being as responsible for his actions, because we can legitimately assume that he possesses the same sense of logic and morality as his society. We cannot justifiably transfer our morality to creatures that do not possess the same sense of reason or logic as mankind.
(This is not taking into account things like culture or mental state. (of the human, not the tiger.))
What does the rest of the class think?
Philosophically yours,
Lisa
Tuesday, January 29, 2008
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5 comments:
i agree that we cannot really label whether the tigers actions were good or bad because they do not necessarily have the same set of morals as we do. personally i think this kind of thing is rarely anything other than instinctive reaction of the animal to outside stimulus which bothers it.
Lisa,
It was I, Nicholas, who commented on the fish and the lure.
In our world, some believe there exists "good" and "bad". This is not so. Events happen and time passes, but there is no good or bad. "Good" and "bad" are only reached through a general understanding of a percent of a population. There are certain actions which may allow for more happiness among beings, or actions which cause devastation. Neither of which are "good" or "bad". These adjectives are simply ideas we humans have applied to reality.
In regards to the tiger mauling a human; it is true that we cannot justifiably transfer our morality to creatures that do not possess the same sense of reason or logic as mankind. But we cannot transfer our morality to other humans either.
(I'm not sure if you implied that by saying "...not taking into account...")
-Nicholas
Only creatures capable of morals can be held accountable for said morals. If it's not possible for you to understand you're causing someone or something else suffering, it is not wrong: inferring that morality is largely determined by conscious cruelty and our avoidance of it.
Thus, it would seem Mr. Tiger is in the clear, because he/she neither knew the pain he/she was causing, nor did so in order to consciously inflict pain (beyond defensive or non-self-reflective instinct).
In response to Nick, however, I think we can, in some instances, apply (but not necessarily transfer, I suppose) a moral standard on humans other than ourselves. For example, in a circumstance where someone has the choice to commit a murder or not, and has no need to commit said murder (no one's being held hostage, there are no external variables), it is always wrong for that person to choose the option of murder (again, under these unpressured circumstances.
I think an objective morality exists in much the same fashion as other objective things exist--we can notice trends of cruelty in interpersonal and interspecies relationship and say that certain acts are usually wrong. However, this is far from moral absolutism (as often rigorously defending by religious authorities), as unlike other objective systems, an objective morality would be largely based on a person's personal circumstances--certainly it would not be necessarily wrong to commit that murder if a million people would die should they not. Other examples will be less clear cut than that one, but if it's possible for people outside of a situation to make a judgment on the best possible moral action, I think it possible to form an objective morality.
However, such a system would have to take into account an enormous number of variables, and would hopefully rest with appropriate sympathy for the moral agents themselves, as I think plenty of moral theory nowadays permits. But with a good criticism for cruelty (and hopefully lacking the intrusiveness of imposed morality where inappropriate), one can find a general approach to circumstances that would allow them to parse different situations and figure out the appropriate moral action, and it need not be solely a personal endeavor.
Maybe morality is, as Nicholas suggests, not in the world, but in ourselves. But if there is (as I suppose there must be) a universal human nature, then there should also be universal (objective) moral truths.
Perhaps indeed morality cannot be found in the world: the universe (sans sentience) does not dictate anything to us in the way of compassion, I think. But I speculate that consciousness itself can dictate moral action: assuming the traits we find in the animals on our planet are as useful as those on any planet (which they may not be), perhaps the framework of morality is imbued (via survival of creatures and their social structures) into sentient entities, and thus, once expatiated upon reaching sapience, would dictate a relatively uniform morality (that would pay due respect to interpersonal conflict).
But I think I'm getting a little too high in the clouds; for now, I'll say, self-reflective consciousness tends to notice the many positive (for the self and others) results of compassionate action, and thus forms morality. I think it not only human nature, but sapient recognition that builds morality.
So I guess I'm just agreeing. While I do think morality will come from nowhere but the self (and one's experiences with other sentient entities), I think universal moral principles exist. Why did that take so long to say?
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